We consider how to organize the processing and marketing of an agricultural product when farming costs are known only by the individual farmers. We show that when marginal costs are un-correlated, the market for …nal goods is competitive, and the market for processing is non-competitive, the socially optimal production levels are sustained by a cooperative and a cooperative only. We show also that the cooperative form is particularly useful when the cost uncertainty is large and the net average revenue product is small.
Introduction
Cooperatives play an important role in several industries. In Denmark, for example 97% of all the milk, 91% of all the pigs, 60% of all eggs and 30% of all fruit and vegetables produced in 2001 were processed by cooperatives, cf. Danske Andelsskaber (2002) . In a processing (or marketing) cooperative, the members are the primary producers and they are also the residual claimants.
In contrast to the actual success of cooperatives in some industries, the theoretical literature have identi…ed a series of cooperative shortcomings. "Classical" problems of traditional cooperatives include a quantity control problem arising from the decentralized rights to choose output levels. Other problems include the free-rider problem arising from the ability of new members to bene…ts from investments by old members and the associated horizon problem arising from the lack of interest in long term investments with bene…ts exceeding the membership period. The root of these problems lies in the (incomplete) allocation of property rights. A member of a cooperative does not receive all the bene…ts nor does he face all the costs of his activities. Part of the motivation for the so-called New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) is to remedy these disadvantages by introducing closed memberships and tradeable production rights, cf. Harris, Stefanson and Fulton(1996) .
The dominant role of cooperatives in some industries and the coexistence of cooperatives and investor-owned companies in others suggest that cooperatives must have comparative advantages in some dimensions that can dominate or at least outweigh their disadvantages in others. One of the possible advantages of cooperatives that have been suggested in the literature is the ability to avoid wrong productions and investment levels due to hold-up issues. Staatz(1984) among others has argued that the risk of post-harvest 'hold-ups' is a primary reason for cooperatives active presence in the marketing of short-lived products like fruits, vegetables and milk. On the other hand, it is well known also that ordinary hold-up problems can be handled e¤ectively by using long term contracts, cf. e.g. Tirole(1988) . By negotiating the transaction terms before production (or investment) decisions are made and by committing not to renegotiate, i.e. by using ex-ante rather than ex-post negotiations, the production costs will be honored and the producers will not be forced to under-produce, cf. also Bogetoft and Olesen(2003) . Hence, the traditional hold-up problem is solved by a cooperative -but not only by a cooperative. The hold-up problem does not su¢ce to rationalize the existence of cooperatives.
In this paper, we therefore look at another although related incentive problem, namely the adverse selection problem arising from asymmetric information about the producers' costs. In agriculture, for example, there are good reasons to suggest that the individual farmers have superior information about their cost structure. Our aim is to show that the resulting incentive problems in some settings can be handled e¤ectively using a cooperative -and a cooperative only. We hereby suggest an economic rationale for cooperatives by providing a framework where the traditional cooperative payment schemes coincide with the unique optimal allocation of the gains.
The idea is simple. Consider an investor owned monopsonist processor. If farmers have private information about their production costs, ex-ante, negotiations may not be e¢cient. The more e¢cient farmers will try to extract information rents by imitating the less e¢cient ones. The rational response of a processor is to reduce transactions below the …rst best level. This leads to an ex post ine¢cient situation. As we shall show, the only way to eliminate the associated economic loss in some cases is to have the producers integrate forward, i.e. take over the processing, and to do so on a cooperative basis where the processing surplus is shared among farmers in proportion to patronage.
To illustrate, let us assume that farmer i can produce 1 unit of a homoge-nous output at costs c i : Also, let the sales price net of processing costs be p: Now, to avoid ex post ine¢ciencies, all types of farmer i with c i · p must produce. Also, the highest costs type with c i = p must be paid p to earn nonnegative pro…ts. Now, all other types of this farmer can claim to be equally costly and charge p as well leaving the processor with a zero pro…t. The same goes for the other farmers. This is in e¤ect the cooperative outcome since everyone is paid the same price p per unit and all pro…t goes to the members. An investor owned processor to the contrary would rather ration away some farmers a priori, say all farmers with c i inĉ i · c · p and hereby earn at least p ¡ĉ i on the remaining types of farmer i. In this paper we shall formalize a generalized version of this argument.
Of course the advantage of the cooperative allocation of surplus -and in particular the necessity of using the cooperative sharing rule -is only valid under some more restrictive conditions. We shall formalize these below when we set up the model -and we shall discuss how robust our results are to relaxations of the basic assumptions as we go along. To get a …rst idea of the base case favoring the cooperative form, however, it is useful to think of settings with a monopsonist processor facing a …xed price for the …nal goods. In such cases, the cooperative outcome is like a market outcome with competition for intermediation such that the processors earn zero pro…ts. The cooperative outcome ensures the socially optimal production levels even if there is only one processor. The policy implication is: If a processor exercise market power towards its suppliers they may be better o¤ forming a cooperative. Market power in processing could -for example -be due to a natural or regulated monopsony.
We suggest that several sectors have su¢ciently many similarities with this base case and that our conclusions may therefore provide partial explanations of some important real world situations. The model could for example give a stylized picture of the milk-cheese sector. Transportation di¢culties of fresh milk may give a diary a local monopsony position while easy storage and transportation of the …nal products, the cheeses, may prevent that individual dairies have market power. A similar situation with transportation limitations on the processor's inputs but not on its outputs may be relevant in meat production, where the transportation costs may be relatively high on the input side and possible restricted by animal welfare rules. The …xed price and natural monopsony situation may also be relevant in relation to the provision of environmental goods by farmer and forest owners, say a larger habitant for special species where the value on the output side is regulated and the coordination of multiple land owners makes a monopsony arrangement on the input side natural. Another example could be the transmission of electrical power. Regulation may prevent multiple transmission companies, and to avoid the social loss from the exercise of market power against the producers, it may therefore be advantageous to have the government operate the transmission net -or for the producers to operate the network on a cooperative basis. Di¤erent countries have chosen these di¤erent solutions.
(Observe also that the demand for electricity -at least in the short run -is quite inelastic to price changes. This makes the assumption of a …xed price of the processed goods quite natural.)
The idea of the cooperative solution can also be related to the idea of the Coase theorem in a environment with one-sided asymmetric information, cf. e.g. Milgrom and Roberts(1992) and Tirole(1989) . The bargaining ine¢ciency in such cases is resolved when the better informed gets all the bargaining power. In the cooperative solution, the bargaining power is precisely given to the more well-informed, namely the farmers. Despite of the similarity in conclusions, we emphasize that the paper o¤ers non-trivial extensions of this basic logic. While the classical result deals with a single seller single buyer situation, the present deals with a situation with multiple sellers and a single buyer. Also, the multiple sellers have private information about their own marginal costs but not about that of the other sellers. The simple result is therefore not directly applicable. In our case, the bargaining power allocated to the group of multiple sellers must be divided among these. We show that the delegation of power to the well-informed is still attractive. Also, we show that division of bargaining power among the sellers mustin some cases -take place according to the cooperative principles of sharing the income proportional to the delivered quantities. Hence, we deal with multiple sellers with superior but di¤erent information and with the division of bargaining power among these.
In this paper, we also investigate under what conditions the incentive advantages of cooperatives are particularly signi…cant. Using more speci…c distributional assumptions, we point to two factors, namely the uncertainty about producer costs c i and the size of the earnings potential (pro…t margin), p ¡ c i ; in the industry. We show that high cost uncertainty and low earnings potential favor cooperatives.
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated considerable variation in the underlying costs of individual farmers. For recent studies in American, European and Asian contexts, see for example Morrison Paul, Nehring, Banker and Sumwaru(2004), Lansink and Pietola(2002) and Coelli (1995) . Even after the costs have been adjusted for production conditions, weather and similar veri…able di¤erences, there is often a considerable cost spread left. This spread is routinely interpreted as variations in farm management practice or managerial skills, an empirical counterpart of the cost types in game models.
The earnings potential is probably also quite limited in those parts of agriculture where competition is particularly …erce, say in the bulk production of homogenous goods that can be sold on the world market, e.g. grain and pork carcases, or in the production of fruits and vegetables, where there scale of the individual productions are more limited and one may therefore have strong competition even at local markets. These, then, are settings where we would expect cooperatives to have particular comparative advantages.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We …rst present the set-up and a useful reformulation of the incentive compatibility constraints. In Section 3, we characterize the socially optimal production structure and the pro…t sharing principles that may support it. The similarities with cooperative processing is explored in Section 4, and the e¤ects of investor owned processing is investigated in Section 5. Some examples are given in Section 6, extensions are discussed in Section 7, and conclusions are given in Section 8.
The Model
In this section, we develop a model of a production-processing system with asymmetric information about production costs and di¤erent possible ownership structures in processing. For ease of reference and because agriculture is an obvious example, we refer to the up-stream …rms, the producers, as farmers, and to the down-stream …rm as the processor.
We consider n farmers producing the same (homogenous) product. For farmer i 2 I = f1; :::; ng; we let q i be his production level, C i (q i ) := c i ¢ q i his production costs and q U i his capacity. Hence, we assume that each farmer has a constant marginal costs and a …xed capacity level. This eases the calculations below. Moreover, we get qualitatively the same results with more complicated cost structures as we shall discuss in the extensions. The farmers maximize expected pro…t -and their reservation utilities are 0 for simplicity.
We assume that information about production costs are asymmetric. The marginal cost c i at farmer i is known by himself only. The other farmers as well as the processor only hold beliefs about his cost. Speci…cally, we assume that the costs are independent and that c i 's density f i (c i ) = dF i (c i )=dc i ; where F i (:) is the cumulative probability distribution for c i , has support
. Production capacities will be considered public information. This favors an investor owned processor below. In the cooperative setting, the solution does not depend on information about capacities.
The assumed independence of the marginal costs of individual farmers are of course stylized. It …ts a situation where the marginal costs are determined by the abilities of the farmers rather better than a case where weather has a strong impact. In the latter case, we would expect considerable correlation between the costs. We shall return to the assumption below. For now it su¢ces to emphasize that we get qualitatively the same results in a more realistic situation where the costs are composed of a common economy wide (factor price) e¤ect plus independent idiosyncratic costs elements, i.e. when c i = c CO + c IDi with the individual costs c IDi ; i = 1; :::; n independent. The economy wide cost level c CO is simply normed to 0 in our set-up.
As a matter of notation, we stick to traditional conventions and let c = (c j ) j2I = (c 1 ; :::; c n ); c ¡i = (c j ) j6 =i = (c 1 ; ::; c i¡1 ; c i+1 ; ::; c n ); C = £ j2I C j = C 1 £ ::: £ C n and C ¡i = £ j6 =i C j = C 1 £ :: £ C i¡1 £ C i+1 £ :: £ C n : Also, we let E c i c ¡i (:) be the conditional expectation operator with respect to c ¡i given c i . Thus, for a arbitrary function g : C ! < we have 
where the last expression follows by the assumed independence of the individual costs. The farm output is processed and the processed product is sold at a market. We assume that one unit of farm output leads to one unit of processed product and that the market price of the processed product net of processing costs is constant and equal to p. In the terminology of the economics of cooperatives, p is the constant Net Average Revenue Product (NARP). Relaxations of the market conditions will also be discussed in the extensions below.
There are many possibilities to organize processing. Di¤erent ownership structures are possible, price and quantity negotiations may be organized in di¤erent ways, production rights may be allocated using di¤erent auction mechanisms, and pro…ts may be shared using a variety of sharing rules to name just a few of the design variables available. Fortunately, by the revelation principle, see e.g. Myerson(1979) , we know that whatever can be accomplished by a given structure can be accomplished also in a direct revelation game in which the individual farmers have incentives to honestly reveal their private costs and where production and compensation levels are allowed to depend on the cost types reported.
Therefore, let the production and compensation plans for farmer i, i 2 I , be given by
The interpretation is that when the farmers report c, farmer i is supposed to produce q i (c) and he will be paid s i (c).
We can now formulate the organizational design problem as one of designing production and payment plans q(:) = (q i (:)) i2I and s(:) = (s i (:)) i2I to solve the following program (P)
The objective function of the design program depends on the setting and will be speci…ed as we go along. The speci…cation will depend on the ownership structure. A social planner, for example, would like to maximize social welfare and an investor owned processor would like to maximize processing pro…ts.
The …rst set of constraints are the individual rationality (IR) constraints. They ensure that all farmers get at least their reservation utility. The second set of constraints are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. They ensure that all farmers will reveal their true types. The third set of constraints are the budget balancing (BB) constraints. They say that the farmers can not get more than what is earned at the market place.
In the formulation above, we have assumed that the incentive problem is related to the cost types only. The planned production levels q i (c), i 2 I , can be implemented without additional incentive problems e.g. because the chosen production levels are directly veri…able such that deviations can be avoided with in…nitely harsh punishment treats. We therefore do not need to let s i (:) depend on the actual production levels. Observe that by assuming costless implementation of the chosen production plans, we e¤ectively rule out post harvest side-trading among the farmers. We shall argue in the extensions that relaxing this assumption would further favor a cooperative.
The incentive compatibility constraints induce considerable structure on the production and payment plans. To see this, consider an arbitrary production and payment scheme for farmer i, q i (c) and s i (c), and let ¹ q i (c i ) and ¹ s i (c i ) be the corresponding conditional expected production and payment when the types of the other farmers have been integrated out, i.e.
We now have the following useful lemma, proved in the appendix. 
Lemma 1 gives a partial characterization of the production and payment schemes that are incentive compatible. The characterization is given in terms of restrictions on an individual producer's expected production and payment given his type. By risk neutrality, the schemes can always be altered via lotteries with zero means without a¤ecting the incentive compatibility nor individually rationality constraints. We will encounter this ‡exibility at several instances below, and we shall refer to it by saying that schemes are determined "modula zero mean lotteries".
According to Lemma 1, the less e¢cient types produce less (on average), i.e. the higher the marginal costs c i , the less the (expected) output ¹ q i . Also, the expected payment ¹ s i (c i ) is -up to an integration constantdetermined entirely from the production scheme. In addition to the direct coverage of production costs, c i ¢ ¹ q i (c i ), we see that a given type must have an additional payment that increases in the production levels of the less e¢cient types with costs in [c i ; c
Observe that Lemma 1 provides information about the structure of the production and payment plans for an individual farmer as a function of his type. Lemma 1 does not provide information about the payment relationships across farmers. Lemma 1 is driven solely by the incentive compatibility conditions. The other conditions from the design problem, individual rationality and budget balancing, impose additional conditions on the production and payments plan. In particular, the budget balancing constraint ties together the payment across farmers. In this sense, the design problem is not a traditional multiple agents problem that decomposes into n single agent problems under cost independence.
Lemma 1 makes it easy to analyze alternative organizations as we shall show below.
Central Planner's Solution
We …rst characterize the set of production and payment plans that are socially optimal. This provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the outcome of alternative organizations. We shall talk about this as a central planner's solution.
In the setting of this paper, this benchmark is particularly attractive. As we shall demonstrate, a central planner is able to implement the …rst best production plan. This is possible despite of the asymmetric information about costs and is follows easily from the assumed conditions in the processing and the …nal product market.
Formally, the central planner (CP) is de…ned via his objective. His aim is to maximize the market value minus the production costs of all farmers, i.e. the integrated pro…t from production and processing
The central planner is assumed to have no more information about the costs of any farmer than does the other farmers or an investor-owned processor. Therefore the general design problem from Section 2 is still relevant.
We see that the central planner's objective -as the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints -depends only on average production and payments. Except for the budget balancing constraint, therefore, the central planner's problem is e¤ectively separable in n single farmer problems.
To maximize the net bene…ts from production and processing, the central planner would like farmers with costs below p to maximize production and the others to not produce at all. The central planner would therefore like to implement the following production plan
Note that for the average production ¹ q CP i (c i ) to be either the minimal or the maximal, 0 or q U i ;the speci…c production level q CP i (c) for all possible cost values must be either 0 or q
This plan is the …rst best plan, i.e. the optimal production plan with perfect cost information.
To show that this ideal solution is actually feasible, we must specify the payment plan that makes the combined production-payment plan satisfy the IR, IC and BB constraints. However, this is easy. Using Lemma 1, we know that to be incentive compatible, the expected payment must satisfy
To be individually rational, we furthermore need k i¸0 8i Let us consider now the case where p · c U i 8i. This is the case where the information asymmetry is non-trivial, i.e. it is not common knowledge a priori what the socially optimal production levels are for any of the producers. We can say also that this represents a not too pro…table market condition -the net average revenue product p does not make it optimal to have all farmer types produce.
From (2), we get for an arbitrary i that ¹ s
when production takes place, c i · p, and ¹ s CP i (c i ) = k i otherwise. Using the budget balancing constraint, the payment can be pinned down even further. To ful…ll BB, we need k i = 0 8i as is evident from the no-production case. Hence, when p · c U i 8i, the payment plan must satisfy
If p > c U i for one or more farmers, the above payment plan still works. However, in this case the farmers with a maximal cost c U i below p will generate a surplus if they are paid according to the p ¢ q U i plan in (2) . This surplus can be allocated in di¤erent ways. In this case, therefore, there are alternative arrangements, including some which would result in a non-allocated surplus, e.g. a strictly positive pro…t to a processor.
The possible solutions in this case are all those with the structure given in (2) to make them incentive compatible, and constants k i ; i 2 I that ensure individual rationality, k i¸0 ; i 2 I; and ful…llment of the budget constraint
With the given structure on the payment scheme, the individually rationality and budget constraints reduce to
We summarize these observations in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1
The social planner can implement the …rst best production levels. Moreover, to do so, the cost dependent expected payments must satisfy (3) when p · c U i 8i , and (2) and (4) when p > c U i for some i 2 I
The solution in Proposition 1 is strikingly simple. When p · c U i 8i it e¤ectively sends the market signals directly to the farmers. One way to implement this market oriented solution is to ignore the communication procedure of the revelation game and o¤er the farmers to buy whatever they produce at the price p per unit. This solution also works when p > c U i for some i 2 I . As we shall see below, this is also the cooperative solution. Note that by the risk-neutrality of the farmers, the optimal payment schemes can only be characterized in expected terms. The payment plan is de…ned modula zero mean lotteries. The market oriented solution is not only attractive by being simple. It is also attractive from a point of view of treating all farmers equally. Moreover, the equal treatment of all farmers implies that the mechanism is not vulnerable to side trading -no group of farmers can pro…t from trading the product among themselves before it is processed.
When
. This leaves a surplus that can be allocated independently of production levels. The inequalities (4) puts some constraint on the way the surplus can be allocated to the farmers and the processor. It is possible to pay out quantity independent reimbursements as long as they use up at the most the surplus generated by the farmers that have costs below the price p with certainty, i.e. the farmers j with p > c U j . If we choose k i ; i 2 I to comply with (4), the non-farmers, e.g. the processor or the government, is left with a surplus P
Note also that the distribution of the surplus in the case p > c U i for some i 2 I must in general be independent of the production levels to avoid interfering with the incentives to produce. This is ensured here by sharing the surplus via the k i terms rather than via the marginal payments. 1 
Cooperative Processor
There are some obvious links between the central planner's solutions in the last section and the cooperative arrangements that have been used so extensively, in particular within agriculture.
Imagine that processing is undertaken by a cooperative. The cooperative is owned and operated by the farmers. Assume furthermore that this is a traditional cooperative in which 1. Equity gets no interest, 2. Surplus is allocated to members in proportion to patronage, and 1 Of course since the agents in our model either do not produce or they produce at their capacity levels -some of the possible ways to share a surplus would look like a quantity dependent sharing. This would be the case for example if they share the surplus proportional to the capacities. 3 . Members have a right to deliver total production to the cooperative Using the …rst two principles, we see that the total surplus p P j2I q j must be allocated as
In this payment plan, we have taken into account the fact that any farmer j only knows his own costs c j and that his production decision therefore can only depend on c j . By the farmers being risk neutral and by using the third principle above, we get that farmer i will choose q i (c i ) to solve
Point-wise optimization gives that the cooperative (CO) solution is
i.e. the cooperative leads to the socially optimal solution from the last section. Combining with Proposition 1, we therefore have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A cooperative (5) implements the socially optimal, …rst best production plans. Moreover, when p · c U i 8i; these plans can only be implemented if the surplus is shared as in a cooperative, possibly modi…ed by zero mean lotteries.
Proposition 2 gives an information economic rationale for cooperatives in not too pro…table market, i.e. when p · c U i 8i, such that we cannot be certain that any given producer should produce. Cooperatives not only su¢ce to give the socially optimal production levels. Cooperative sharing of the net revenue product is necessary also to ensure optimality (except for zero mean lotteries). In any other organization, the farmers' attempts to extract information rents and the processor´s attempt to reduce these will lead to a loss of desirable production. We will demonstrate this in details in case of an investor owned processor in the next section.
Observe how this rationale di¤ers from the traditional rationale of avoiding under-production or under-investment associated with the hold-up possibility, cf. the Introduction. While the cooperative solves the hold-up problem, so does other arrangements like a priori negotiated (long) contracts. In the present model, the cooperative is not only an optimal organization, it is the only optimal organization. Long or short contracts aside, any attempt to divert any of the surplus from the farmers -or any attempt to share the surplus in any other way than proportional to patronage -will lead to sub-optimal production.
In a more pro…table market, i.e. when p > c U i , the cooperative still leads to the social optimum. But there are other possibilities as emphasized by Proposition 3. There is some room for paying the processor non-zero pro…t -or for paying a non-zero interest on the cooperative's equity. There is also some room for payments that are not proportional to partronage. The room for variations is given by surplus that is not allocated by the cooperative principles,
Investor Owned Processor
Let us assume now that the processor is an investor owned, risk neutral pro…t maximizing monopsonist. This case is interesting to consider for at least two reasons. First, it represents the classical alternative to the cooperative case. Second, a comparison will allow us to quantify the comparative advantages of the cooperative and to study in more details under which circumstances these advantages are particularly large. Being a monopsonist, we assume that the processor has all the bargaining power. Speci…cally, he is able to o¤er contracts on a take it or leave it basis and to commit to these contracts as information is revealed. In particular, this implies that the processor can costlessly avoid any hold-up issues.
The investor owned (IO) monopsonist's contract design problem can therefore be formulated as the general problem (P) with the following more speci…c objective
The objective of the investor owned processor is to maximize his own pro…t and not the integrated farming and processing pro…ts that the social plan-ner is maximizing. The investor owned processor is therefore willing to forgo some socially attractive production, i.e. to forgo some production from farmers even though they have c i < p. This so-called rationing is done to save on the information rents that more e¢cient types can extract. The optimal rationing will depend on the details of the distribution of types.
To get simple results, we invoke a bit of regularity on the cost distributions. Speci…cally, we will assume that the cost distributions have weakly increasing hazard rate, i.e.
This is a property shared by many standard distributions, including the normal, the uniform, the chi-squared, the logistic and the exponential distribution. The importance of the hazard rate is intuitively obvious. The optimal rationing must balance the probability of foregoing attractive production by a marginally rationing away c i (proportional to f i (c i )) with the probability of reducing the payment of information rents to the better types (proportional to F i (c i )):
A simple rationing principle turns out to be optimal. The processor will e¤ectively set a hurdle costĉ (< p), and use this as a basis for production and payment plans just like in the previous models, i.e. the investor owned (IO) schemes are 2
Types with marginal costs below the hurdle costsĉ i produce at their capacity level and are compensated as if the true cost wereĉ i . The hurdle costs for agent i,ĉ i ; is determined as the unique solution to
except for the boundary case where (p ¡ c
We summarize these properties in a proposition, proved in details in the appendix.
Proposition 3
With increasing hurdle rate, the investor owned processor only implements the socially optimal productions when (p¡c
In other cases, he reduces the productions to comply with (6) and (7).
Above, we have characterized the best possible outcome for the monopsonist. One interpretation of the revelation game is that the monopsonist o¤ers a menu of contracts from which the farmers' choose. Another is that he commits to a certain production and payment plan which depend on the costs reported by the farmers. The outcome could also be implemented by a mechanism in which the processor simply o¤ers farmer i a price equal toĉ i per unit.
The optimal solution is generally ex post ine¢cient. Whenĉ i is an inner solution, we haveĉ i = p ¡ F i (ĉ i )=f i (ĉ i ) < p: This means that socially attractive production is forgone, namely when
The monopsonist avoids trading with the higher costs farmers, not because they are too costly per se but to save on the information rents paid to low cost farmers. This loss of welfare is the result of the asymmetric information. Such losses are common in models involving negotiations under asymmetric information, cf. e.g. Akerlof(1970) , Vickrey(1961) and Chatterjee and Samuelson(1983) . A model with much the same structure of the optimal solution as above is Antle and Eppen(1985) .
Another interesting feature of the solution with an investor owned processor is that the farmers are subject to di¤erent contracts depending on the a priori information that the processor have about them. They will in general face di¤erent prices o¤ers if their cost distributions di¤er. The processor is in general willing to pay more to a farmer the more he knows about his costs. Thus for example, if his costs distribution undergoes a mean preserving decrease in spread the price o¤er will increase, cf. e.g. Antle, Bogetoft and Stark(1999, 2001 ) for theoretical results and numerical illustrations. The intuition is simple -the smaller the variance the larger the cost of rationing in terms of forgone trade 3 . The di¤erences in contract conditions has two implications. One is that the social cost of having an investor-owned processor is not only that attractive production is foregone. Also, for a given level of aggregate production P i2I q i the allocation of production among the farmers may be ine¢cient since marginal costs (of the marginal type) may not be equal. 3 The optimal hurdle is given by the (p ¡ĉ i ) =
condition above. This means that farmers with a higher hazard rates will tend to have a lower cost hurdles. In loose terms, this occurs when the average costs are smaller or when the cost spreads are larger.
The other implication is that the solution with an investor-owned processor may be vulnerable to side-trading. If transfer of production among the farmers cannot be controlled, this may eventually force the investor owned processor to use the same price o¤er to all farmers. This solution in this case will still be socially sub-optimal in most cases.
One empirical implication of the di¤erence between the cooperative and the investor owned solutions is that the suppliers in the former should have higher average costs. This is an interesting observation, suggested by one of the referees, since it opens for empirical veri…cation or falsi…cation. We are not aware of studies that explicitly have addressed this in an empirical setting. There are numerous studies of the cost implications of cooperatives but they tend to focus on the -often lower -cost e¢ciency of the cooperative rather than at the cost levels at its member. On the other hand, the result is consistent with casual empirisme. Thus for example, farming in a country like Denmark is expensive due to high land and labor prices and environmental restrictions -and yet the farmers succeed. They often point to the cooperative organization as a possible explanation. Of course, to test the model using this empirical implication requires careful control for alternative explanations. Thus for example, the higher average costs could also be the result of elastic demand for the …nal product and the overproduction that results in cooperatives in such situations since the farmers are paid the average -as opposed to the marginal -(net) revenue (product) by the cooperative. Therefore empirical investigations should control for the …nal goods market conditions as well.
Some Examples
An advantage of the formulations above is that they not only support the qualitative conclusion that investor owned processing leads to a welfare loss in many cases where the cooperative processing and sharing of pro…ts would solve the central planner's problem. They also allow us to measure the extent of the welfare loss and to identify circumstances where this is particularly important. In this section, we provide some illustrations.
Let us assume that costs are independent and uniformly distributed,
where " i 2 [0; ¹] measures the uncertainty about farmer i's costs. The hazard rate for farmer i is therefore
Also, let the (average) net revenue product be p. We assume that p1
i ¡ " i 8i such that we cannot exclude production from any farmer to begin with in a social optimum.
The potential social value from having farmer i produce -which is also the social value realized by the cooperative -is therefore
Also, it follows from the analysis above that an IO processor will choosê
If for example ¹ i = 1; " i = 1 and p = 2, the IO processor o¤ersĉ i = 1; i.e. he foregoes trading with half of the farmer types, the high costs types c i 2 (1; 2], to reduce his payment to the low cost types c i 2 [0; 1] . A IO processor will therefore lead to a social loss -unless
does the IO processor lead to the socially optimal production. Hence, the expected pro…t margin p ¡ ¹ i must exceed 3 times the uncertainty measure " i to avoid a social loss. 4 A measure of the Relative Social Loss RSL from having an IO as opposed to an CO processor could be
where the nominator is the social loss (from not producing when costs are high) in the IO regime and the denominator is the total social gain available -and realized by a cooperative. The relative social loss RSL as a function of p is depicted in Figure 1 below when ¹ i = " i = 1:
A more detailed illustration of the Relative Social Loss, RSL, is provided in Figure 2 where we assume ¹ i = 1. We see that except for the triangle with p ¡ ¹ i¸3 " i (i.e. when the "Pro…t Margin"¸3¢ "Uncertainty"), there is a loss associated with the IO processor. Moreover, the loss increases in the uncertainty parameter " i (since this induces the processor to ration more) and decreases in the pro…t margin p ¡ ¹ i (since this induces him to ration less).
The production rationed away by the IO processor is the most expensive and therefore the socially least valuable. This explains why we, in the case ¹ i = 1; " i = 1 and p = 2, loose 50% of the productive cases but only (RSL=) 25% of the value.
It should be observed, however, that across farmers, we may not just ration away the least attractive cases. If for example p = 1:5 and we have two farmers, one with costs uniform on [0; 1] and the other with costs …xed at 1, we would chooseĉ 1 = 0:75 andĉ 2 = 1. Thus, all the cost levels we forego with farmer 1 is actually more pro…table than the one we accept from farmer 2. This illustrates that the ine¢ciency from private ownership may not just appear as lost production. It may also show itself as a misallocation of production rights where the least productive are allowed to produce more simply because their incentives are easier to control. 
Extensions
The derived optimality of the cooperative organizational form rests on two important assumptions, namely that 1) the cost types c i ; i 2 I are independent and 2) the net average revenue product p is constant
In addition, we have relied on a more technical assumption, namely that 3) production costs are linear with given capacity constraints. We will now brie ‡y discuss these assumptions and the e¤ects of loosening them.
Dependent Types
The assumption that types are independent is necessary to prove Proposition 1. Speci…cally, (1) presumes independence. If the types are correlated, a social planner could undermine the informational advantage of the agents by comparing their messages. By paying most when an agent's message is likely given the messages of the other agents, the planner could reduce the payment to the agents. With perfectly correlated types, it would su¢ce to pay the true costs in all cases. Hence, with correlated costs, the cooperative solution is but one possibility to get the …rst best outcome. Indeed, with perfectly correlated costs, an IO processor would also generate the …rst best outcome.
One way to relax the independence assumption without changing our main results is to work with a re…ned set of IR constraints
8c; i i.e. by assuming that the farmers must never end up with a negative cash‡ow. The stronger IR constraints can be interpreted as limited liability constraints, safety …rst constraints, or as the usual participation constraints coupled with extreme risk aversion (prohibiting negative cash ‡ows). Using the stronger IR constraints, and assuming that the joint distribution of types has support C = £ i2I C i , we get basically the same propositions as above for the central planner and the cooperative -but we get it without using Lemma 1. This is not di¢cult to prove: Assume that p < c U i . To be socially optimal, we need farmer i to produce as long as c i · p. The c i = p type of farmer i must therefore be paid at least p per unit and since all the more e¢cient types can imitate this type, they must all be paid at least p per unit. The budget balancing constraint now gives that they must be paid exactly p. Of course, there may still be room for some zero mean lotteries. An IO processor will still ration production since otherwise he will earn zero pro…t. Hence, in this case the socially optimal outcome is accomplished by a cooperative and -modula some zero mean lotteries -by a cooperative only.
Another way to relax the independence assumption without altering the qualitative conclusions is to assume that the marginal costs at farm i, c i , is the sum of a common economy wide (factor price) e¤ect plus independent idiosyncratic costs elements, i.e. c i = c CO + c IDi 8c; i with the individual costs c IDi ; i = 1; :::; n independent. If the the common term c CO is stochastic but observable to the processor, we get similar results except that the common costs should be covered initially, i.e. the average net revenue product p should …rst be reduced to p ¡ c CO . Thereafter all the results above are valid.
Market Power and Scale Economies in Processing
The assumed constancy of the average net revenue product p is an assumption that the processor has no market power and that there are no scale economies in the processing (or less realistically, that these e¤ects even out). Our conclusions -and in particular our line of reasoning -are sensitive to this assumption. Relaxing it may destroy the cooperative's ability to give the …rst best production levels. Truly, …rst best production levels may not be possible under any arrangement when p depends on the aggregate production, and in some cases the cooperative sharing may therefore still be optimal, namely when the social planner's solution is closer to the coope solution thatn the solution o¤ered by the IO processor. However, when the price p becomes more sensitive to production level, the social planner's solution may actually be approximated better by an IO than by a CO processor in this case.
The assumption of a constant p is necessary to avoid the overproduction problem otherwise generated by a cooperative. In a cooperative, a member takes into account the price reduction that his production in ‡icts on himself, but he does not internalize the loss imposed on the other members. This makes him overproduce. An IO processor on the other hand internalizes these losses. It follows that an IO processor may be socially superior as the internalization of the price reduction e¤ect may more than outweigh the rationing due to asymmetric information. An added drawback of the cooperative when p decreases with production and costs are uncertain is the lack of coordination of production levels. By the processor's revenue function being concave, the socially optimal production levels will be coordinated such that farmer i produces relatively more when farmer j has high costs and therefore produces less. This coordination is necessary even though costs types are independent -but it is not accomplished by a traditional cooperative.
Despite of these drawbacks of a cooperative when p depends on the production level, it is worthwhile to mention that the relative merits compared to an IO organization may depend intimately on the details of the output market. Albaek and Schultz(1998) for example have demonstrated that the lack of output control may constitute a strategic advantage in a Cournot market, much like the employment of a sales maximizing manager may be attractive, cf. Tirole(1988) .
Cost Structures In addition to the above qualitatively essential assumptions, we have introduced a more technical assumption about the class of cost functions. We have assumed that the farmers have linear costs and …xed capacity levels. One can argue that this is a relatively narrow class of cost functions. This is deliberate, however. Since we want to demonstrate that a cooperative is necessary to ensure the socially optimal production levels, a small class of function makes the result stronger 5 . The other implication, i.e. that the cooperative su¢ces to give optimal production levels, would favor working with a large class. This way, however, is simpler and it holds for arbitrary classes of cost functions: Whatever his cost function c i (q i ), farmer i will choose the socially optimal production level, i.e. the q i maximizing pq i ¡c(q i ) when processing is organized as a cooperative since in this case he is paid [p
Conclusions
We have shown that with asymmetric information about farm level production costs, the only way to ensure socially optimal production levels may be to organize processing as a cooperative. This gives an information economic rationale for cooperatives. Speci…cally, we have shown that a cooperative is necessary when farmers' marginal production costs are independent, the net average revenue product from sales is constant, and the income distribution does not matter. We have shown also that the relative advantage of cooperatives (compared to investor owned processors) is largest, when the cost uncertainty is large and when pro…tability is limited, i.e. when the net marginal product is small compared to the primary production cost. In these cases an investor owned processor tends to ration away more social value to gain private value. Since the agricultural sector may have these properties, we suggest that our results may in part explain the apparent success of cooperatives among farmers.
In reality, the choice of organizational structure or contract and sharing rules is not only determined by incentive costs. The resulting behavior at the downstream market for example should be taken into account as well. When the downstream market gets less competitive, the social advantage of the cooperative reduces since the quantity control problem of the cooperative becomes more signi…cant. Still, as discussed above, the relative merits of the cooperative will depend on the details of the output market, and the higher production may actually have strategic advantages in some oligopolistic …nal goods markets. We leave the analysis of the interaction between the input market and such output markets to future research.
Proof of Lemma 1
Initially, we note that by independence, the conditional expectation operator E ci c¡i (:) does not depend on the speci…c value of the costs c i . Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraints are equivalent to
Now to prove the only if part, we must show that the two properties in the lemma hold. For this purpose, we consider a given i and note that (8) 
In particular, c 
Proof of Proposition 3
We see …rst that the processor's objective -as the constraints -depends only on average production and payments. Also, the objective -as the constraints -are e¤ectively separable in farmer speci…c problems.
Using Lemma 1, we shall now characterize the solution to contract design problem. Assume that (s(:); q(:)) is a feasible solution and letĉ i be the largest cost type for farmer i that will produce, i.e.ĉ i = supfc i j¹ q i (c i ) > 0g: By the …rst property in Lemma 1, ¹ q i (c i ) > 0 for all c i <ĉ i and ¹ q i (c i ) = 0 for all c i >ĉ i . Also, it follows from the monopsonist interest in reducing payment that ¹ s i (ĉ i ) ¡ĉ i ¢ ¹ q i (ĉ i ) = 0:
6 Using the second property in Lemma 1, we therefore have
Substituting this into the objective function and using partial integration, 6 By IR ¹ s i (ĉ i ) ¡ĉ i ¢ ¹ q i (ĉ i )¸0. Now if ¹ s i (ĉ i ) ¡ĉ i ¢ ¹ q i (ĉ i ) = " > 0 , we also have ¹ s i (c i ) ¡ c i ¢ ¹ q i (c i )¸" 8c i <ĉ i since the producer's expected pro…t is decreasing in the cost type, cf the proof of Proposition 1. In this case, the contract could be improved by reducing payments with " for all c i ·ĉ i : This would not a¤ect the IC constraints.
we get
This objective must be maximized subject to the constraints that production levels are weakly decreasing, i.e. 8i; c 
